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3.1 Introduction 
Recent events in the US and Europe have witnessed the limitations of conven-
tional macroeconomic models to predict and explain large economic recessions 
and crises1 and to provide guidance for policies that attempt to resolve them. 
This chapter describes an agenda (that includes Stiglitz (2015), Guzman and 
Stiglitz (2014, 2015) that addresses two important puzzles faced by conventional 
macro models. Firstly, they are incapable of explaining situations in which there 
are large changes in the state of the economy with no commensurate changes in 
the state variables that describe it. Secondly, they cannot explain situations that 
involve persistent underutilization of the factors of production of the economy, 
a typical feature of crisis times. 
These issues are not simply theoretical curiosities1 but they have important 
implications for policy guidance. A model that cannot account for the persistent 
subutilization of factors of production will overestimate the speed of recovery 
from a crisis (a typical feature of the Fed forecasting models, and of IMF models 
as well2). 
The key premise of our theory is that individuals may have differences in 
beliefs, and these differences can be economically exploited through markets. We 
assume there exists a market for bets that makes it possible. The betting model 
can be thought of as a metaphor that depicts a general situation in which trade 
leads to expected gains from differences in priors. In equilibrium1 agents will 
engage in betting that leverages the side of the distribution of beliefs that each 
of them perceives as relatively more likely. Because each agent believes that, on 
average, he is going to win, the betting leads to a perception of a higher aggre-
gate wealth - wealth that is not consistent with the societal feasibility locus; and 
this has implications on agents1 economic decisions. The 11excess 11 wealth is what 
we define as pseudo-wealth. If those differences in beliefs disappear or cannot be 
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exploited anymore (due, for example1 to a shock to priors that eliminates any ini-
tial difference), pseudo-wealth will disappear, leading to adjustments in behavior 
that will amplify the initial decrease in expected wealth1 with macroeconomic 
consequences. 
The source of the disparity in beliefs is not important for our analysis. What is 
important is that we refer to events that rarely occur, over which it is not sensible 
to think that all the individuals share the same beliefs on the likelihood of their 
occurrence. As our theory wants to show that is possible to have changes in the 
state of the macroeconomy that go beyond changes in the state variables of the 
economy1 we assume that the "rare event 11 does not affect any fundamental, that 
is, it has no initial effect on the real capacity of production of the economy -
an event that we define as a sunspot. Our theory shows that the destruction of 
pseudo-wealth associated with its realization not only will lead to ex post subop-
timal intertemporal paths of consumption, but it will also lead to destruction of 
real wealth. 
An important result of our theory is that completing markets may lead to 
an economy that produces less in every period - but that may still be efficient 
according to the standard Pareto efficiency notion. This 11 contradiction11 raises 
important questions in terms of welfare analysis. Should a market that only 
allows for speculation based on differences of beliefs1 hence possibly increas-
ing everyone's ex ante expected utility but diminishing the level of output of the 
economy (and hence the level of ex post expected utility for a utilitarian social 
welfare function), be allowed? The answer will depend on the criteria we use for 
welfare analysis. 
Finally, our theory highlights the important role of "natural" adjustments. 
After a shock that destroys aggregate pseudo-wealth, the natural adjustments 
of the economy lead to further reductions in expected wealth and lower aggre-
gate demand, worsening the macroeconomic state. Our model shows that under 
some conditions the equilibrium with flexible wages is associated with lower 
production and aggregate labor income than the equilibrium with (somewhat) 
rigid wages. Wage rigidities could have distributive effects that positively affect 
on the demand for goods, reactivating the economy. This will generally be the 
case when demand effects are large - particularly when they dominate over 
substitution effects. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents the 
main premises of our theory. Section 3.3 distinguishes two cases of analysis, 
an endowment economy and a production economy1 and presents the main 
results. Section 3.4 analyzes the welfare implications of those results. Section 
3.5 studies the implications of the "natural" adjustments that follow a shock to 
expected wealth, and delves into policy implications. Section 3.6 concludes the 
chapter. 
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3.2 Premises of the theory 
The main premise of our theo1y is the existence of heterogeneous agents. 
This heterogeneity takes the form of different beliefs over the occurrence of a 
sunspot-a rare event that affects no state variables of the economy. 
Before the sunspot occurs, there are two possible states: sunspot (S) or no 
sunspot (0). The true probability of occurrence of state Sis 2. Once the sunspot 
occurs, it cannot occur ever again. Figure 3.1 describes the space of states. 
The economy is populated by two forward-looking representative consumers 
(who in a version of the model are also workers), A and B, that differ in their 
beliefs over A, such that ;i_A >An. Once the sunspot occurs, the difference in 
beliefs disappears, as everyone understands that the sunspot cannot occur again. 
The difference in prior beliefs may be due to different reasons. It could arise 
due to differential access to information (which would be compatible with the 
assumption of rational expectations), or simply due to differences in the model 
agents use to analyze the world (which would be incompatible with the assump-
tion of rational expectations). In both cases, posterior beliefs will be the same as 
prior beliefs. The reason is that as the sunspot occurs only once, there is nothing 
to learn from its non-occurrence. 
The mechanisms we describe are consistent with a 11rare event" that can actu-
ally transform the capacity of production of the economy (such as a structural 
transformation). We choose to assume that the event of interest takes the form of 
a sunspot because our goal is to show that it is possible, in equilibrium, to obtain 
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Figure 3.1 Space of states 
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fundamentals. The sunspot assumption simplifies the analysis: by leaving aside 
any possible change in the capacity of production of the economy, it is clear 
that all the changes in the state of the macro-economy are the consequence of 
changes in possibilities of exploiting differences in priors. 
The model features an infinitely Jived small open economy with perfect access 
to international credit markets, where default is ruled out by assumption. Debt 
is denominated in tractable goods. Finance is provided by foreign risk-neutral 
investors whose opportunity cost is the risk-free interest rate (that we assume is 
constant). 
There is a market for short-term bets over the realization of the sunspot. As 
consumer A is more optimistic than B about the likelihood of the sunspot1 in 
equilibrium both agents will trade a bet that A wins if the sunspot occurs, while 
B wins if it doesn't. 
Let Pt be the equilibrium price of the bet in period t, defined as the amount 
agent A pays to agent B for a bet that has a gross payoff of 1 in state S and 0 in 
state 0. Each agent will expect a positive gain. Agent A expects to win 1-Pt with 
probability 1A and Pt with probability 1 - ,iA for each dollar (or good) she bets. 
Hence, the expected gain of agent A for betting in period t, a concept that we 
define as agent A1s pseudo-wealth, will be 
where bt is the amount of betting in equilibrium. 
Similarly, agent B's pseudo-wealth will be 
Jn every period pseudo-wealth is destroyed but also created by new betting, until 
the period when the sunspot occurs, when no new pseudo-wealth can be created. 
Thus, the expected wealth of the society will decrease at that moment. 
Consumers' goal is to maximize the expected discounted value of utility, by 
choosing consumption of goods, betting1 savings or borrowing, and in a version 
of the model, also leisure. 
3.3 Results 
Closing the model requires assumptions on the formation of output. We analyze 
nvo cases: an endowment economy where consumers receive and consume only 
a tractable good, and a production economy where consumers enjoy utility both 
from a tractable and a non-tractable good, and both goods can be produced in the 
domestic economy. 
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3.3.l Endowment economy 
We first assume that every agent receives a constant endowment of the tractable 
good in every period. Agents enjoy utility only from the consumption of that 
good. They decide consumption, borrowing, and betting in every period. 
The creation of the market for bets has two effects: it creates pseudo-wealth, 
which increases consumption. But it also creates uncertainty, which increases 
precautionary savings. We are interested in analyzing situations in which the 
increase in expected wealth leads in equilibrium to increases in spending and 
aggregate demand. Thus, we constrain the family of permissible utility functions 
to the ones that guarantee that result. In Guzman and Stiglitz (2014), we solve 
the model for a utility function that features no precautionary savings, that is, 
the quadratic utility function. 
Agents want to smooth out consumption over time. Given their expectations 
of future wealth (which include the positive pseudo-wealth component), they 
want to consume more than the constant endowment they receive. Then it will 
be optimal to borrow. If no sunspot is realized, agent B will win the bet and agent 
A will lose. The distribution of wealth changes in favor of agent B. Pseudo-wealth 
is destroyed1 but new pseudo-wealth is created, as it is possible to bet over the 
occurrence of the sunspot in the next period. 
Importantly, the future will look the same as a period before if no sunspot is 
realized (as can be seen from the bottom node of the second period in Figure 3.1). 
Realizations of states act as permanent wealth shocks - positive for the winner 
and negative for the loser. Even though agents want to achieve a smooth path of 
consumption, they are unaQle to reach that outcome. Consumption of agent A 
will decrease over time until the sunspot is realized, and the opposite will occur 
with consumption of agent B. 
At the moment the sunspot is realized, agent A wins and experiences an 
increase in wealth, while the opposite happens to agent B. But the key issue 
is that no new pseudo-wealth can be created. The society as a whole feels less 
wealthy. The presence of pseudo-wealth had led to a positive aggregate borrow-
ing. That debt must be repaid. After the sunspot, there is no more uncertainty, 
and both individual and aggregate consumption will be smooth. Then, in order 
to satisfy the transversality condition, aggregate consumption must be smaller 
than the aggregate endowment in every period since the occurrence of the 
sunspot. 
Concluding, the presence of pseudo-wealth will lead to an ex-post suboptimal 
intertemporal allocation of consumption for the society. Aggregate consumption 
will change discontinuously with no changes in any of the state variables describ-
ing the economy. Furthermore, the existence of pseudo-wealth will lead to a 
persistent 11boom11 in consumption that will, ex-post1 imply that discontinuous 
fall. 
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3.3.2 Production economy 
Next we assume that output is endogenous. The economy produces two goods, a 
tradable and a non-tractable. Consumers are also workers (they work for the firms 
that produce those goods), and enjoy utility from both types of goods, as well as 
from leisure. They receive labor income as a compensation for their work. 
Goods are produced by foreign firms. We assume that they do not spend their 
profits in the domestic economy. The reason for this assumption is to ensure that 
demand is not driven by the consumption of entrepreneurs. 3 
Production of the non-tractable good requires only labor and exhibits decreas-
ing returns to scale. 
We introduce a real rigidity in the production function of the tractable good. 
Producing this good requires labor and a fixed supply factor, which can be inter-
preted as land. The production function exhibits marked decreasing returns of 
labor. To simplify1 we assume it takes a Leontief form. The combination of 
the Leontief assumption and the land endowment constraint implies that the 
tractable sector cannot absorb unlimited amounts of labor. This representation 
intends to capture the reality of economies in which production in the tractable 
sector is not labor-intensive (as it is the case for modern agricultural sectors), 
or in which there is a limit to its expansion that constrains the capacity of the 
economy to produce the adjustments through it. 
In the initial period, the equilibrium will also be characterized by positive bet-
ting; hence agents will have positive pseudo-wealth. The implication is that they 
will decide to work less than in a world "With no pseudo-wealth and to consume 
more than the wage they receive - which they can accomplish by borrowing. 
As in the case of the endowment economy, in every period in which no 
sunspot is realized, agent B will win and agent A will lose the bet, which will 
affect their paths of consumption. But in this case, the individuals' labor supply 
will also change: agent B will decrease her labor supply every time she wins the 
bet (as she is wealthier and wants to consume more leisure), while agent A will 
increase it to partially compensate for the experienced loss. 
The dynamics that is triggered by the occurrence of the sunspot is richer 
than in the endowment economy. At that moment1 agent B will decrease her 
consumption of the tractable and the non-tractable good, and will increase her 
individual labor supply. Agent A will do the opposite. As pseudo-wealth dis-
appears, however, the expected wealth for the society will decrease (that is, 
the increase in expected wealth of agent A is lower in absolute value than the 
decrease in expected wealth of agent B1 as the gain of agent A relative to her 
expected gain is smaller than the loss of agent B relative to her expected gain). 
Therefore, the aggregate demand for the tractable and the non-tractable good will 
decrease, and the aggregate labor supply will increase. 
The decrease in the demand for non-tractable goods will lead to a decrease in 
terms of both its production and its price. Therefore, the labor demand in the 
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non-tractable sector will fall. If there were no diminishing returns to labor in the 
tractable sector, it could fully absorb the excess labor supply, and the equilibrium 
in the labor market could be restored with no effects on the equilibrium wage. 
However, with diminishing returns, real wages fall. In the model explored here, 
in which we assume a strong complementarity between labor and land in the 
tractable sector, the excess of labor supply will not be absorbed by that sector if 
the land constraint is binding. The adjustments must occur through the non-
tradable sector, where there is no limit to labor absorption but where decreasing 
returns to labor will lead to a lower equilibrium wage. 
The fall in wages creates a macroeconomic extemality: The behavioral adjust-
ments of the consumer who lost the bet negatively affect the prospects of the 
consumer who won it (even though the bet itself can provide insurance against 
the contingency of the shock occurring). This externality operates as an amplifi-
cation device. In the second round of adjustments, the fall in wages will lead to 
a reduction of consumption of the tractable and the non-tractable good for both 
the loser and the winner, as well as to an increase in their individual labor supplies, 
triggering further reductions in the prices of non-tractable goods and in wages. 
And the fall in wages will also increase the burden of debt, which is denominated 
in tradable goods
1 
accelerating this downward spiral. This process will continue 
until a new equilibrium is reached. 
Generally, fluctuations in pseudo-wealth will require large changes in prices to 
restore equilibrium, even when the economy experienced no modifications in 
the state variables that describe it. 
After the sunspot, there is no more uncertainty. Therefore, consumption of the 
tractable and non-tractable good and labor supply will be smooth over time for 
all agents - hence aggregate demand and labor supply will also be smooth. As 
in the case of the endowment economy, the society will need to produce more 
than it consumes, in order to repay the debt that had been initially taken as a 
response to the perceptions of higher wealth. As the tractable sector was produc-
ing using its full capacity, however1 production in that sector cannot increase. 
On the other hand, consumers want to consume less of the non-tractable good, 
which will occur in equilibrium - and at the same time, production of the non-
tradable good will be lower. Overall, the economy will not only experience lower 
consumption after the sunspot, but also lower production. Therefore1 the econ-
omy will produce less always, that is, both before and a~er the sunspot, than it 
would produce in a world with no market for bets. 
In the new equilibrium, it is even possible that the winner of the bet is worse 
off. This will be the case if the loss associated with the reduction in wages dom-
inates the gain from winning the bet. Therefore, the agent would be worse off 
ex post and ex ante in every possible state, with respect to the world in which 
betting is not possible-but not with respect to the world in which betting is pos-
sible, but he does not bet, as in the latter situation he would still suffer from the 
negative macroeconomic externality that arises at the time the sunspot occurs. 
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3.4 Welfare analysis 
The previous section showed that the production economy with a market for 
bets is characterized by lower total output in every period than the production 
economy with no market for bets. Should, then, the social planner prohibit 
the market for bets? Or should it allow the creation of a market that, while 
completing markets, leads to lower output? 
This is a complex question. Dealing with it requires taking a stance on how to 
assess social welfare in a context of heterogeneous beliefs. 
Suppose the planner decides to respect individual beliefs. Then, it could be 
the case that creating the market for bets is Pareto efficient. This will be true if, 
given individual beliefs, everyone feels better off ex ante - even though everyone 
understand that, under a utilitarian social welfare function1 the society will be 
worse off ex-post due to the misallocation of consumption and leisure1 as well as 
the negative effects on total output. The reason why everyone feels better off is 
that everyone believes he is the one with the correct beliefs, so everyone believes 
that losses will most likely be experienced by the others. 
It is even possible that everyone feels worse off ex ante when betting is possible. 
This would occur if the negative macroeconomic externality (the fall in wages 
triggered by behavioral adjustments of the loser of the bet at the time pseudo-
wealth disappears) is sufficiently large - so large that even for the winner of the 
bet in the sunspot state the gain from winning doesn't compensate for the fall 
in wages. 
Suppose instead that the planner decides not to respect individual beliefs, but 
instead uses beliefs that are consistent. Suppose, in particular, that the planner 
uses so-called reasonable beliefs, defined as a convex combination of the different 
agents' beliefs (Brunnermeier, Simsek, and Xiong, 2014): ,tR = Lt=A,BaiAJ, with 
L a;=l. 
i=A,B 
Then, for every reasonable belief and for a utilitarian social welfare function, 
welfare would be lower when the market for bets exists than when it doesn't. 
The first reason for /1 excessive betting" arises both in the endowment and the 
production economy: it comes from the intertemporal misallocation of con-
sumption due to the perception of an unfeasibly high expected aggregate wealth. 
In the production economy, there are additional factors affecting the volume of 
betting in equilibrium and, therefore, whether the level of betting is excessive. 
On the one hand, the non-internalization of the macroeconomic externalities 
makes it more likely that there is excessive betting. On the other hand, under 
rational expectations, consumers know that due to the macro externalities, the 
value of a dollar is larger in the state in which the sunspot is realized. This second 
force reduces the appetite for engaging in bets that have a negative payoff at the 
moment of the sunspot. 
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There are deep philosophical questions regarding what beliefs the planner 
should use for policy decisions. While taking a stance that doesn't respect indi-
vidual beliefs could be considered invasive, not doing it could imply that it is 
optimal to do policies that make the society worse off ex-post, even though they 
make it better off ex ante from the viewpoint of individual (possibly distorted) beliefs 
- an issue that could contradict the mandate of an elected "planner" who is 
supposed to make decisions in the best interest of the society. More generally, 
respecting individual beliefs could imply that the optimal policies must entail 
an intentionally biased delivery of information that increases the dispersion of 
beliefs in order to increase pseudo-wealth1 as each individual would feel happier 
when pseudo-wealth is larger. 
Perhaps the n1ain conclusion of this section is that we have shown that in a 
world of heterogeneous beliefs, it is possible that completing markets make the 
economy worse off instead of better off. 
3.5 Destabilizing adjustments 
In our theory, the adjustments are conducive to a new equilibrium. After the 
shock
1 
there is full employment with lower wages - and "full employment" 
means that consumers voluntarily want to work fewer hours at the new wages, 
even though as a response to the shock they intended to work more hours (at 
the former wages). It is a full employment equilibrium, but one in which utility 
levels are significantly lower than prior to the shock, and even possibly lower 
than if there were impediments to rapid changes in wages. 
The presumption in conventional economic theory is contrary to this latter 
possibility. Adjustments in wages and prices play a key role to ensure the stability 
of the equilibrium. Only rigidities for wage and price adjustments would impede 
a quick transition to a new stable equilibrium in which resources are fully utilized. 
There is an alternative theory that suggests that the forces responding to the 
disequilibrium initially generated by a shock may actually be destabilizing. These 
theories, originating in the theory of debt deflation developed by Fisher (1933), 
and revived in the 1980s and 1990s by Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993), among 
others, argue that the problem is excessive price flexibility - the fall in prices or 
wages, in the presence of unindexed debt and other contracts, would increase 
the real value of leverage1 decreasing aggregate demand1 decreasing prices fur-
ther, and increasing real leverage further. This work calls attention to a different 
11market failure" than price rigidities: the incompleteness of markets and con-
tracts. As in the general theory of the second best, correcting one market failure, 
that is, making wages and prices more flexible, can exacerbate the consequences 
of other market failures. 
Adjustments that are destabilizing through aggregate demand effects can play 
an important role in our theory of pseudo-wealth-induced fluctuations. We 
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explained how changes in the possibilities of exploiting different priors, or how 
shocks to priors that dissipate the initial differences, may lead to a large decrease 
in aggregate pseudo-wealth, and as a consequence also in aggregate consumption 
and labor demand. The restoration of full employment needs to offset the wealth 
effects, requiring large adjustments in wages and relative prices, especially if sub-
stitution effects are relatively weak compared to wealth effects. The 11 natural 11 
adjustments lead to further reductions in expected wealth and lower aggregate 
demand, worsening the macroeconomic state. 
Our theory shows that it is plausible that the equilibrium with flexible wages is 
associated with lower production and aggregate labor income than the equilib-
rium with (somewhat) rigid wages. The reason is that the fall in wages that results 
from the destruction of pseudo-wealth (that occurs when the land constraint is 
binding) increases the profits of foreign firms in the tractable sector; but those 
firms do not spend them in the domestic economy. Hence, the fall in wages leads 
univocally to a decrease in the demand for non-tractable goods. Workers are thus 
doubly hurt by the wage reduction, both as a result of the transfer of income and 
as a result of a decrease in aggregate demand for the non-tradable goods, which 
cannot be compensated for by an increase in the demand for the tractable good. 
A slower pace of decline in wages (for instance, due to regulations on the speed 
at which wages can fall) would impose a redistribution of wealth from foreign 
firms to consumers - or, equivalently, a redistribution from agents with "low11 
(precisely zero in the model) to uhigh 11 marginal propensity to consume out of 
incomes. Workers would work less than they would have liked, but demand for 
the non-tractable good would be higher, increasing labor income twice. 4 
This redistribution of profits has positive amplification effects on the econ-
omy through demand effects. The larger labor income leads to a higher demand 
for both the tractable and the non-tractable good. While the higher demand for 
the tractable good does not alter its level of production (but decreases the trade 
balance), the higher demand for the non-tractable good leads to an increase in 
its price and level of production, and an associated increase in the demand for 
labor in the non-tradable sector. These adjustments lead to further increases in 
aggregate demand, until a new equilibrium (where the wage constraint may be 
binding or not) is reached. If these demand effects are strong, the new equilib-
rium could even feature a larger level of production of the non-tractable good and 
larger employment than in the equilibrium with flexible wages. Generally, this 
will be the case when the demand effect is more important than the substitution effect.1 
This result, according to which wage rigidities create a distributive effect that 
translates into a demand effect that results in the end in more labor income and 
production than would be the case in the perfectly flexible world, is not exclusive I 
of our theory. It has in general been pointed out in the above-mentioned liter-
ature on Fisher-Greenwald-Stiglitz effects and macroeconomic externalities (as 
for example in Eggertsson and Krugman, 2012), where Fisher effects may imply · 
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a positively-sloped aggregate demand, and in the literature on inequality and 
growth (Stiglitz, 2012; Mian and Sufi, 2014, among others). 
3.6 Conclusions 
Much of well-established macroeconomic theory relies on the assumption of 
common beliefs. However1 such an assumption is not consistent with much 
observed economic behavior. The key question is whether it is only a convenient 
simplifying assumption with no major consequences for explaining important 
macroeconomic issues, or whether in fact it misses issues that are especially 
significant in understanding macroeconomic instability. 
This chapter has discussed a series of papers that introduce a theory in which 
differences in beliefs play an important role in explaining macroeconomic fluctu-
ations. Our analysis focused on the concept of pseudo-wealth1 and the associated 
notion that there can be large changes in perceptions of aggregate expected 
wealth even when there are no changes in the real factors of production of the 
economy. In our theory, due to inconsistent aggregate perceptions on expected 
wealth1 the sum of the present discounted value of individuals' 11planned11 con-
sumption exceeds the feasibility set during times, only to require adjustments 
later on. These fluctuations have repercussions for the aggregate economy: We 
described how fluctuations in the possibliity of exploiting differences in beliefs 
give rise to large fluctuations in pseudo-wealth, .and thereby, into aggregate 
demand and economic activity. 
An important conclusion is that completing markets (as happens witb the cre-
ation of the market for bets) may lead to unsettling results in terms of welfare, as 
it is possible that everyorie's ex ante expected utility increases while the levels of 
production of the· economy decrease permanently- and yet everyone, still under-
standing this situation, would vote for the creation of the market for bets. But if 
the planner decided to use other beliefs, different than tbe ones from the indi-
viduals but consistent, under a utilitarian welfare function it would be optimal to 
prohibit the bet, to prevent what clearly appears to be (from an ex post perspec-
tive, and even from an ex ante perspective using a consistent of set of beliefs) the 
misallocations of consumption of goods and leisure and the destruction of real 
wealth that negative wealth shocks (as the destruction of pseudo-wealth) entail. 
Contrary to the standard wisdom, we have also seen that the natural adjust-
ments that follow the destruction of pseudo-wealth may exacerbate the eco-
nomic downturn, moving the economy to an equilibrium with lower aggregate 
labor income than would be obtained under conditions of non-fully flexible 
wages. Those within the country are unambiguously worse off with more flex-
ible wages. Then an optimal policy might be directed towards reducing rather 
than increasing wage flexibility1 as doing so would create a distributive effect 
that would stimulate aggregate demand and production. 
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The models presented here are full equilibrium models - the only assumption 
that has been changed from more standard models is the very plausible one that 
individuals differ in their beliefs. There is, accordingly, no unemployment. The 
labor market always clears. But in more plausible macroeconomic models there 
may be nominal or real rigidities. Then the volatility to which the variations 
in pseudowwealth that we have described will have more adverse welfare conseR 
quences: they can give rise to fluctuations not only in employment but also in 
unemployment. Moreover1 such fluctuations may be greater the greater labor 
market flexibility. But these are issues which will have to be pursued in a sequel 
to this chapter. 
Notes 
1. We are indebted to Bruce Greenwald, Daniel Heymann, Peter Howitt, Ivan 
Werning, participants of the 2014 !EA World Congress in Jordan, INET-YSI 
Workshop on Macroeconomic Fluctuations at the 2014 Annual Meeting in 
Warsaw, the 2014 Montevideo RIDGE Forum, the 2015 AEA Annual Meeting in 
Boston
1 
as well as participants of seminars at INET, University of Trento, JaveriR 
ana University of Bogota, University of Tokyo, GRIPS, Hitotsubashi University, 
University of Buenos Aires1 Northeastern University, Catholic University of 
Louvain, and especially to our discussant John Geanakoplos on one of the 
papers that form the basis of this article for useful comments and discus-
sions. We are thankful to the Institute of New Economic Thinking (!NET) for 
financial support. 
2. Although in the case of the IMF models the overestimation of the speed of 
recovery may be explained by other factors. On the consistently flawed fore-
casts of the Fed on the US recovery from the 2008 financial crisis and of the 
IMF on the European economies in recession, see Guzman (2014, pp. 35-40). 
3. Assuming that the marginal propensity to consume is smaller for firms than for 
consumers would suffice. Empirical evidence shows that the marginal propen-
sity to consume is decreasing in the level of income (Mian1 Rao, and Sufi.1 
2013). 
4. It is understandable, in this context, why the owners of the foreign firms and 
those representing their interests would argue for the virtue of wage flexibility. 
5. And the substitution effect when the land constraint is binding in the trada]Jle .: 
sector is zero. 
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